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CHURCHILL APPRAISBS HITLBR: 1930-1939 
by Steven Wittenberg
INTRODUCTION
The ringing of his bedside telephone awakened Winston 
Churchill on the fifteenth of May, 1940. The time was 7 a.m. and this 
was a very unusual hour for Churchill to receive telephone calls. On 
the other end of the line was the very distraught voice of Paul 
Reynaud, the French Prime Minister. He spoke rapidly, in English, 
and to the point. His first sentence was, "We have been defeated." 
Churchill, barely awake, was silent at first. Reynaud continued: "We 
are beaten; we have lost the battle."* 1 Churchill started to respond in 
an attempt to calm Reynaud. The French premier repeated the 
words: "defeated”, "lost the battle". Not only was Reynaud under 
stress, but he was also trying to impress upon Churchill the 
suddeness of an abyss opening up before Paris. Churchill said he 
would fly to Paris the next day.
Upon his arrival he realized the situation was much worse than 
he expected. Reynaud's phrases were not simply due to his excitable 
temperament. The first thing Churchill noticed was a black cloud of 
smoke rising from the French Foreign Ministry on the Qua! d'Orsay. 
Clerks were burning important documents at a rapid pace. This
tjohn Lttkaci T k  Dual (New York, 1991). 64.
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there w u  nothini between the advancing Oermens and Paris. At 
first, Churchill refused to accept reality. He could not believe the 
situation was as bad as the French portrayed it. However, as the day 
progressed he became aware of just how quickly the French position 
had deteriorated. It had taken Hitler's Germany one week to rout 
the much vaunted French army. Bven though this was a frightening 
realization, Churchill was able to maintain his composure. Now, his 
England was the only thing standing between Adolf Hitler and the 
fall of western European democracy.
It had only been a few days earlier, on the tenth of May, that 
Churchill had been appointed Prime Minister. Churchill was to write, 
"As I went to bed at about 3 a.m., I was conscious of a profound 
sense of relief. At last I had the authority to give directions over the 
whole scene. I felt as if I were walking with Destiny, and that all my 
past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial."2 
It is interesting to ponder if Churchill had any idea just how great a 
trial was before him. For eighty days Churchill alone would stand in 
Hitler's path. In his hands rested the outcome of the Second World 
War and the fate of the world thereafter.
After August of 1940, the situation would change. Hitler would 
consider an invasion of the Soviet Union which would precede an
' 2
2 111; 1929.1941 (New York, 1974), 9.
invasion of England. A lw , after August, 1940, Roosevelt began to 
tarn h it sympathetic words of hope for B ehead into action inch as 
supplying Baglaed with necessary arms to carry on lie  war. Only 
now are we beginning to realise Just how dose Hitler came to 
winning the war during the eighty days between May 10 and July 
31, 1940. And yet the "Duel", as this eighty day battle of the minds 
between Churchill and Hitler has been labeled, had really begun 
years earlier. Churchill and Hitler had known about and disliked 
each other for a long period of time even before either of them had 
been chosen leader of their respective countries.
In order to understand the "Duel", a duel of minds, it is 
necessary to go back in time and trace the development and 
formation of Winston Churchill's opinions and beliefs on Hitler's rise 
to power. In order to give this thesis balance, we will also briefly 
give Hitter's opinions of Churchill. While Churchill was an avid 
writer, Hitter almost never put anything down on paper.3 Thus, we 
have a much fuller record of Churchill's opinions of Hitler than of 
Hitler's feelings on Churchill.
Also, before his reentry into the political world, Churchill wrote 
for a number of periodicals in order to pay the bills in the 1930's. 
Thus, his submissions to British Newspapers such as the Daily Mall, 
the Evening Standard, and the D rily Tfllflgraph serve as excellent 
guides to what Churchill's public opinions were concerning Hitler and
^Obviously K»mpf ii considered a substantial piece of writing. However,
what is bring referred to is Hitler's failure to put down how he felt at 
particular moments during bis rise to power and during bis reign as Ftthrer of 
the Third Erich.
his riM to power. Ws alio have Chorchitl's msmeirt and tbs Isttsn  
be wrote to friends n d  relatives which allow a t to sou how m  felt 
aboat Hitler on a more private level.
Hitler, a t mentioned before, did very tittle w ritin |. That, it ia 
harder to trace the development of his feelings towards Churchill.
One of the best sources we have is Hitler’s Tshla Talk, a compilation 
of notes taken by Dr. Henry Picker, an associate of Hitler's, and 
Heinrich Heim, a civil servant in the Reich Ministry of Justice. There 
is no evidence to suggest these notes are inaccurate. There is also no 
evidence to suggest that anything he said was not exactly how he felt 
at the time he was talking.
Thus, die main focus of this paper will be to trace Churchill's 
early newspaper articles, speeches, and personal correspondence 
beginning in November 1930, and leading up to the outbreak of 
World War II and eventually "The Duel". We shall see the story of a 
man, Winston Churchill, who clearly saw the "nightmare" his country 
and the world would face and yet could do nothing to change the 
situation. His constant warnings were ignored until is was too late. 
Beginning in November 1930, leading up to July 1939, we shall 
examine newspaper article after newspaper article in which Churchill 
warns the world of Germany's rearmament and the lack of British 
military strength. We will even look at a speech given by Churchill 
in 1936 to the House of Commons in which he explains that 
everything he had predicted had thus far come to pass. He then 
proceeded to warn them to prepare for the future and was ignored
4
5again. In conclusion, we shall examine Churchill's final pleas for 
rearmament up until the outbreak of World War II.
In order to do this it Is necessary to understand Churchill's and 
Hitler's formative years. Owing to the extensive amount of material 
available on the lives of both these men, all that will be presented is 
a short synopsis of each of their lives leading up to the period of time 
to be examined by this thesis. Next, die years before 1939 beginning 
with Churchill's early writings and speeches concerning Hitler will be 
presented. Also, Churchill's public "relationship" with Hitler in 
twins of how each of them reacted to the other will be set forth. 
Finally, Hider's views on Churchill will be given in order to give this 
essay balance. The structure of dris paper will be primarily 
chronological. The first quarter of the paper will be devoted to the 
yews prior to 1930. Then the heart of the paper will examine die 
years 1930-1939 looking primarily at Churchill's views on the rise to 
power of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism in Germany. Primary 
sources, specifically Churchill's newspaper articles, speeches, and 
private letters will make up the sources for this section. Finally, 
Churchill's wartime and post-war opinions on Hitler will be 
presented in epilogue form in order to make the paper complete.
The diary of John Colville, Churchill's junior private secretary, acts as 
an excellent source for Churchill's wartime impressions. Churchill's 
six-volume Memoirs of the Second World War will be examined to 
uncover Winston’s post-war opinions on Hitler.
6BACKROUND INFORMATION 
CHURCHILL'S EARLY YEARS
Now that the basic outline of this thesis has been put forward, 
let us begin on November 30, 1874, the day of Winston Leonard 
Spencer ChurchiU's birth. Churchill was born at Blenheim Palace, the 
ancestral home of his father Lord Randolph Churchill, and mother, 
the former Jennie Jerome. He was their first child. The British 
aristocracy he was bom into honored social status and ancient title as 
much as it did great wealth. IBs father was the younger son of the 
Duke of Martborou^i while his mother was American bom and bred. 
She had grown up in a wealthy New York family.
However, Winston's future was not assured by his parents' 
social stains. The English aristocracy traditionally passed on not only 
noble titles to their Him  sons, but also the majority of the family 
wealth. T ies, Winston's father was expected to make his own way in 
the world. The only thing Loed Randolph really inherited was his 
honorary title of Lord. This is not to say he did not have an 
advantage over the great majority of those people living in 
nineteenth century Europe. Lord Randolph's education and social 
status opened many doors and created opportunities. It was still his 
responsibility to take advantage of his situation. This he did. He was 
both ambitious and intelligent. Lord Randolph would not, however, 
reach the level of success his son would.
Winston did respect and admire his father. He was not, 
however, close to him. Winston wanted love and attention from his
7father but never really received it. Early in life he chose to suppress 
his disappointment and instead try to win his father's approval and 
respect. One way of doing this was to follow in his father's footsteps. 
Just like Lord Randolph, Winston entered politics. Unlike his father, 
he did not let "temporary” setbacks stop him from reaching his 
political goals. Lord Randolph had resigned as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer when the Prime Minister (Lord Salisbury) and he had a 
disagreement over how much of the annual budget should be allotted 
to imperial defense as opposed to domestic needs. He never really 
recovered from this political blunder4, and he became terminally ill a 
few years later.
Young Winston adored his mother. She was both beautiful and 
quite intelligent. Even though Winston was raised by his nanny, Mrs. 
Everest, (to whom he did remain devoted) he still was dedicated to 
his mother and stood by her side throughout her personal 
difficulties. Lady Randolph was known for having an appetite for 
things that tend not to be good for the human body or soul. From a 
historical point of view, it is even more important that Churchill was 
proud of his mother's American heritage. He adopted his mother's 
standpoint that it was important for the United States and Great 
Britain to remain devout allies. This pro-American point of view 
would later help him win the support of Franklin Roosevelt when 
Britain needed it most.
4Maxwel! P. Schoenfeid BiT ?»**»"" rt,u,gtl1111 H1* l lfa Tt"»— (Malabar, 
Florida, 1973), 3.
8Yount Winston had often been neglected by both hit parents at 
a child yet bote no marks of an unhappy childhood. Some of this 
may be attributed to his English aristocratic attitudes but not all.
The close relationship he had with his nanny may also have given 
him some of the necessary love a child needs. Whatever the case, 
Churchill must have decided at a very young age that his childhood 
was a happy one and that was that. One may see the first signs of a 
courageous spirit in a such a decision. Also, one may argue Churchill 
spent his life working so hard in order to please a father he so 
wanted to impress.
Young Churchill attended Harrow public school and did rather 
well there. He even won a prize for reciting from memory 1200 lines 
of poetry without making a single error. His skills did not impress 
his father enough to stop him from deciding that Winston would 
enter the army. Winston enrolled in Army G ass at Harrow in 1889. 
Owing to his weak skills in mathematics, coupled with his obvious 
bravery, Winston was selected for the cavalry. In 1892, he 
attempted to take the test to become a cavalry cadet. His father 
hoped he would score well enough to become an infantry cadet 
because the Churchill finances were low and such a position would 
entitle young Winston to financial aid. He failed the first two but 
succeeded on the third in 1893.
Churchill's father died two years later on January 24, 1895. 
Seventy years later (and a few days) Winston would join his father 
in dm same churchyard. Due to his mother’s financial problems, he 
would have to make his own way in the world. He did so by
9graduating 20th in his c lan  of 130 at Sandhurst military academy 
which allowed him to enter the 4th Hussars, a cavalry regiment, in 
February of 1893. Due to the lack of conflict in the British Empire at 
this time, Winston felt the need to go search out war wherever it was 
to be found. This decision lead to the beginning of one of his greatest 
passions and forms of supporting himself, writing. He contracted 
with a British newspaper to write letters back from Cuba where a 
war had broken out between the natives and the ruling Spanish. 
During this period he also spent time in the United States. He found 
the country appealing and referred to it as a "very great country"* . 
His love of the United States would prove helpful later in his life.*
i lhid.. 6
*The information concerning Churchill's early life ha* been compiled 
through the use of various sources Including Maxwell Schoenfald's &ii 
w tniaa gfcu»ei»in. hu Ufa Ttm*« and Martin Gilbert's Churchill; A Ufa
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YOUNG WINSTON’S FIRST ATTEMPTS AT POLITICS
After being involved in a number of military campaign* in the 
Middle East and India, Churchill chose to resign from the military in 
1899. His next goal was being elected to Parliament. He lost his Erst 
election as a Tory due to the number of good Liberal candidates 
standing. Even though he classified himself as a Tory, he was for 
universal male suffrage, domestic reform, an eight-hour work day, 
and a salary for members of Parliament that would allow working 
class members to sit.
In September 1899, the Boer War broke out and Winston was 
hired by the by the M oraine Post as its war correspondent. In 
November 1899, he was riding on an armored train that was 
ambushed by the Boers. Even though he was technically a 
noncombatant, he led the effort to free the train and played a key 
role In the rescue of the engine. However, in the process he was 
taken prisoner. Those who escaped returned to England with the 
news of Churchill's heroism, and he received a great deal of news 
coverage. Winston was not finished yet. While being held prisoner 
in Pretoria, he organized an escape that succeeded in freeing himself 
and a number of other British officers. This gained him even more 
praise and coverage in die British press.
11
Upon returning home to England in 1900, Churchill decided to 
uee hie new found popularity to stand for Parliament again. This 
time he was successful; he was elected to represent the constituency 
of Oldham. At twenty-six years of age Winston Leonard Spencer 
Churchill entered the Parliament he would serve for the rest of his 
life.
The first few years of Churchill's life as a Member of 
Parliament were rocky ones. He began to alienate many of his Tory 
Unionist associates as his policies and beliefs became more and more 
liberal. The issue that finally caused the break between Churchill 
and his party was free trade. Churchill was a devout free trader and 
pressed Prime Minister Arthur Balfour for a commitment to free 
trade. Winston lost the confidence of his party when he sought to 
negotiate a truce between the Liberal and Unionist free traders. On 
May 31, 1904, Churchill took the final step. He crossed the floor of 
Parliament and joined the Liberals. He sat down next to David Lloyd 
George.
The January election of 1906 proved to be successful for 
Churchill. The Tories retained only 137 seats with 377 going to the 
Liberals. One of these seats was won by Winston at< a representative 
of Manchester. He was appointed Under Secretary for the Colonies in 
Campbell-Bannerman's government. Winston would remain there 
until April, 1908. At this time, Herbert Henry Asquith replaced the 
dying Campbell-Bannerman as Prime Minister and appointed 
Churchill as President of the Board of Trade. This would be 
Churchill's first cabinet appointment and his first experience with
12
domestic policy. He actually performed quite well and learned the 
importance of social issues. The National Insurance Act of 1911 
owed its enactment to Winston Churchill as well as to David Lloyd 
George. Churchill was particulary involved in the drafting the 
unemployment insurance section of this act.
In 1910 Winston took over as Home Secretary. He was very 
good at the job and helped to enact important prison reforms. 
However, he also developed a reputation for recklessness due to his 
reactions on different occasions to strikes, particualry the miners' 
and railway workers' strikes in 1910 and 1911 respectively.
Winston authorized the use of police which was necessary, but he 
also sent 50,000 military troops fully armed into an already tenuous 
situation. When two strikers were killed, many supporters blamed 
Churchill for their deaths. Another event which caused him further 
public harm was his role in the Ulster crisis. In 1911, Winston was 
appointed head of the Admiralty. The inhabitants of Ulster, a largely 
Protestant northern province in Ireland, threatened to revolt in 
order to block the passage of home rule for all of Ireland. The 
actions of the Ulsterites were supported by many Tory Unionists. 
Churchill, however, had the moral courage to stand up to the 
Ulsterites, and in the spring of 1914 sent warships to Irish ports. He 
insisted that no constitutional government could allow itself to be 
coerced by threats of insurrection. The Tories accused him of 
plotting a bloodbath in Ulster. His use of dramatic gestures had 
caused him problems again. Churchill had alienated the public at a 
time when he needed their confidence most, a time of national crisis.
13
The question of home rule for Irelend was overshadowed and 
Anally dropped for awhile because of the outbreak of World War I. 
Winston found himself in a position well suited to his talents during 
this conflict, that of First Lord of the Admiralty. Prior to the 
outbreak of the war, Churchill had done an excellent job modernizing 
the British Navy. Great Britain had always been known for having an 
excellent navy, but it found itself in a "naval race" with Germany. 
Finally, the Americans had switched from using coal as fuel to using 
oil in order to increase the speed of their larger ships. Churchill 
ordered that the new larger dreadnought ships being built also be 
fueled by oil. Also, Churchill's foresight in testing the mobilization of 
the British Navy during the summer maneuvers of 1913 and 1914 
allowed the British to be able to mobilize quickly when war broke 
out. He became one of the first British officials to push for the 
development of the armored tank. Thus, it is a shame that it is the 
failure of the Dardanelles campaign that Churchill is most 
remembered for during World War I.
THE DARDANELLES
The idea of the Dardanelles came to Churchill from the 
realization that the war was becoming a stalemate. The Allied and 
Entente powers had constructed such elaborate defensive structures 
that offensive measures often ended in a bloodbath. Thus, Churchill 
proposed a new strategy rather than attacking the Germans head on. 
He suggested an attack against Germany's weaker allies hopefully 
"knocking out the props" from under Germany in terms of manpower 
and supplies. Coupled with a naval blockade, Churchill hoped 
Germany would be forced to surrender due to lack of supplies. After 
much speculation, Churchill decided an attack against Turkey was 
the best option. His thinking went as follows: With a defeat of the 
Turks communications with Russia could be restored. Also, the 
Balkan countries which had chosen to remain neutral might choose to 
side with the Entente. Also, Churchill hoped for an Italian alliance 
with the Entente. Finally, Austria would then be surrounded on 
three sides lessening her hopes for victory to almost nothing. Thus, 
Germany would be the lone country facing a multiple onslaught from 
several directions. At least this was how Churchill hoped his plan 
would work when he set out to plan the Dardanelles campaign.
What actually happened almost destroyed Churchill's political 
career. Even though much of what happened was not his direct fault,
15
his actions were severely criticized by a number of Tories then and 
historians later. C.B.W. Bean, an Australian historian who 
participated in the attack on Gallipoli, afterwards asserted that 
through Churchill's "excess of imagination, a layman's ignorance of 
artillery, and the fatal power of a young enthusiasm to convince 
older and more cautious brains, the tragedy of Gallipoli was born."7 
It is true that the original mistakes were Churchill's fault, but he was 
never really given a chance to correct any of his mistakes or even to 
finish what he had begun. Later in his life he would claim that his 
m^jor mistake was to try and carry out a m^jor military operation 
without the necessary authority to follow through on his objectives. 
One may claim Churchill had the rug pulled out from under him 
before he was given a chance to make good on his plan.
The Dardanelles campaign began at 10:45 on the morning of 
March 18, 1915. The opening phase of the operation went even 
better than expected. By the time the six British and four French 
battleships were finished with the Turkish forts, they were unable to 
return fire. Then the tide began to turn in favor of the Axis powers. 
The French battleship Bouvet hit a mine while leaving the Straits and 
sank drowning six hundred sailors. Three British battleships, the 
Inflexible, the Irresistable, and the Ocean all struck mines. Bven 
though casualties were light, fifty killed and twenty-three wounded, 
this was a major setback in a operation that had been going so well.
7 Cited in Schoeafeld, 33.
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Churchill wanted to continue the operation as soon as possible 
with a second attack but his three most senior advisers supported 
the position of the commander in charge of the operation, Rear- 
Admiral John de Robeck. Robeck wanted to wait until the British 
army's 29th Division could arrive to support the attack. It would 
take a minimum of three to four weeks for them to do so. Even 
though Prime Minister Asquith privately agreed with Churchill, he 
refused to overrule Churchill's three most senior advisers. Thus, 
Robeck ended up waiting until the army arrived to attack. By the 
time the army arrived, the original plan had been modified to the 
point where it almost appeared unrecognizable. During the nine 
months proceeding the landings by the British army, never once did 
the British Navy attempt to sweep the minefields or push through 
the Narrows. Churchill no longer had the opportunity to make 
decisions. It was primarily run by General Kitchener and General Sir 
Ian Hamilton and his commanders. Thus writes Martin Gilbert:
Without there having been a naval disaster, without any 
of the harsh slaughter that had become commonplace on 
the Western Front, without any conclusive sign that a 
naval success was impossible, Churchill had been forced 
to abandon a project that could have knocked Turkey out 
of the war, rallied the Balkan States against the Central 
Powers, given Russian a supply lifeline whereby to renew
17
her own offensive in the Bast, and ended the stalemate in 
Prance and Flanders.*
It is true Churchill made a number of errors in judgement 
when he originally conceived the Gallipoli campaign. However, he 
w u  criticised and blamed for a situation he did not have control over 
for the extended portion of the operation. Even though one must 
admit he may have suffered from the over enthusium  and naivete 
of jumping into a situation too quickly that youths often suffer from, 
he still did not deserve the response he received from the Tories and 
the historians of his time. If every individual was judged by the 
mistakes made in their youth and not given a second chance, we 
would not have many of our great leaders and businessmen.
DEATH AND RESSURECTION
Disappointed and believing his career was ruined, Winston 
resigned his government position on November IS, 1915. He joined 
the active service and to his further disappointment was assigned to 
lead a battalion rather than a brigade. After two years he was uked
* Martin Gilbert, anmAlMi A Ufa (New York, 1991), 29S.
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to rejoin the government, specifically the Ministry of Munitions, by 
the new Prime Minister, Lloyd George. The latter suffered from Tory 
wrath due to this appointment, but he was convinced of Churchill's 
drive and abilities after listening to a convincing and impressive 
speech he gave during a secret meeting of the House of Commons on 
May 10, 1917. In the speech Churchill called for the British to take 
up a defensive rather than offensive position until the U.S. could 
enter the war.
Winston did an excellent job at his new position and continued 
to do well after the war ended in demobilizing the British forces. His 
rule of first in, first out allowed for 10,000 men to be released from 
duty each day. Churchill's hard work earned him the job of War 
Minister at about the time Great Britain was questioning what role to 
play in the Bolshevik revolution. Churchill pushed for intervention 
but Lloyd George, conscious of the war-weariness of the British 
people, opposed it. Thus, Churchill began to alienate members of the 
political Left who had become his allies during the previous few 
years. He would remain a thorn in their sides well into the 1930's.
Churchill pushed for moderation when it came to negotiating 
the Treaty of Versailles. He rightly observed that a Europe with both 
Russia and Germany alienated from the rest would prove unstable.
He further pointed out that by 1940 Germany would have twice as 
many men of military age as France. Winston proposed a treaty in 
which Britain promised to come to France's aid if necessary in return 
for France taking a more moderate position in exacting war 
reparations from Germany. Churchill was at this point intelligent
19
enough and had the insight to realize Germany had both the will and 
strength to rise again.
FROM FOREIGN TO DOMESTIC POLICY
With the end of the war and the transference from wartime to 
peacetime complete, Winston in February, 1921, moved from the 
War Office to die Colonial Office. He now began to involve himself 
again in an issue that had caused him a great deal of aggravation 
prior to the outbreak of the Great War, the question of Irish Home 
Rule. Churchill played an important role in gaining the approval of 
the the Treaty establishing the Irish Free State. In 1925, Churchill 
would again play a rede in making peace between Britain and 
Ireland. However, this time he would do so as a Conservative 
minister in a Conservative government rather than as a Liberal 
minister in Lloyd George's coalition government.
Churchill and George's relationship had been deteriorating since 
1921. Winston wanted to be appointed to his father's old position as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer rather than heading the Colonial Office. 
Beginning with their differences about what Britain's role should be 
in the Bolshevik revolution, they grew further and further apart.
They would make one final stand together during the Chanak crisis 
and would lose the election of 1922 (Churchill his seat and Lloyd 
George had already lost the Prime Ministership) together when they
20
both stood as members of the coalition party. Churchill again found 
himself "out in the cold". He lost again in 1923 when he ran as an 
"Liberal Free-Trader" and again in 1924 as a "Independent Anti- 
Socialist" even though he was supported by two conservatives,
Arthur J. Balfour and Lord Beaverbrook. Finally, he returned to 
government later in 1924 when he was elected to Parliament as a 
"Constitutionalist". Churchill returned to his party of origin, the 
Conservative Party, after being treated well by Prime Minister 
Stanley Baldwin. Baldwin bestowed upon Churchill the position he 
had wanted for so long, his father's position, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.
Winston spent the years between 1924 and 1929 concentrating 
on domestic policy. As Chancellor of the Exchequer he was 
responsible for submitting the annual budget to the House. His first 
budget was well received. He also pushed for Britain's return to the 
gold standard. His wishes were met, and the result was a drop in 
food prices for the working household. However, Churchill quickly 
lost the respect and gained a rather notorious reputation from the 
Left due to his extreme reaction to tuc General Strike of 1926. He 
looked upon it as a threat to Britain's Constitution which was 
something the miners and indeed most workers had never intended 
it to be. Even though he took such a strong position during the 
Strike, he was quite even-handed, if not on the workers' side, during 
the post-strike negotiations. Just as he believed during the Ulster 
crisis, Churchill professed the notion that it was best to negotiate 
from a position of strength but then to be merciful and conciliatory.
21
It was a shame that all his hard work went to waste. The 
negotiations resulted in very little advancement in working 
standards, and Winston's hard work was barely credited. He did, 
however, contribute to the passing of the Trade Disputes Act of 1927. 
He spent the next two to three years trying to re-establish Britain 
financially. His policies were quite traditional but his disputes with 
the Admiralty over the size of the Navy budget caused some 
problem s.
Churchill called for the reduction of the number of cruisers 
based on the Washington Naval Conference Agreements of 1921-22 
but the Admiralty claimed they needed at least five more a year. 
Some of Churchill's critics blame him for Britain's lack of 
preparedness at the outbreak of World War II but their claims are 
unfounded. First of all, the Admiralty got the ships they requested 
even though Churchill would have desired otherwise. Also,
Churchill's position changed in the later 20's as he began to realize 
Germany was becoming a threat again. This brings us to the point 
where Churchill began to write about the threat of a new Germany 
and his first mention of Adolf Hitler. Churchill was able to write so 
critically of the British Government during these years because he 
was not a member of it. Unlike most of the members of Baldwin's 
second ministry (1924-1929), Churchill was not a member of the 
National Government (1931-1939). His strong opposition to 
gradually granting India autonomy was not popular with the 
members of the British cabinet and he was thus not asked to join. 
Before we begin to examine "Churchill on Hitler", we must first look
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back to April 20, 1889, the d«y Adolf Hitler was born in order to 
understand the man Churchill was to understand so well.
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HITLER S EARLY YEARS
Hiller was bom in the Oasthof zum Pommer, an inn in the small 
town of Branau Am Inn which forms the frontier between Austria 
and Bavaria. He was the third child of his father's third marriage. 
Alois Hiedler, Hitler's father (he would change his name to Hitler 
twelve years before the birth of his son Adolf), had been the 
illegitimate child of Maria Anna Schicklgruber. He would keep her 
last name for forty years. Even after she remarried a man named 
Johann Georg Hiedler, who by tradition became Alois's father, he 
retained the Schicklgruber name until he was nearly forty and then 
changed it again from Hiedler to Hitler. Thus, we do not really know 
who Hitler's real grandfather was or if he was Jewish as a number of 
historians have speculated.
Hitler's older brother and sister, Gustav and Ida respectively, 
died in infancy. His younger brother Edward died at the age of six. 
The only sibling who lived to grow up was his younger sister Paula. 
Hitler never kept in touch with her but he did form a relationship 
with his half-sister Angela who kept house for him at Berchtesgaden. 
Peculiarly enough, it was her daughter, Geli Raubal, whom he would 
eventually fall in love with.
Adolf Hitler's father was over twenty years older than his 
mother. He was a cold and short-tempered man who rarely paid 
attention to his son and when he did it was often to beat him. Even
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though Hitter wrote with sentiment and respect about his father in 
Mein Kampf. privately he told a number of close friends how he 
hated his father and everything his father stood for. Hitler’s mother, 
just like Churchill's, was the love of her son's life. Hitler worshipped 
her. She was a hard-working and warm-hearted woman who gave 
her son more love and attention than Churchill ever received from 
his mother.
Both sides of Hitler's family came from the Waldviertel, a poor, 
remote country district, lying on the north side of the Danube, some 
fifty miles north-west of Vienna. His childhood was not the one of 
poverty and deprivation that he wrote about in Main Kampf. Rather, 
his father had a good pension that allowed Adolf the chance for a 
good education. His father died when he was fourteen, but be did 
not leave the Lins Realschule (secondary school) because Us mother 
could not afford it but rather because his grades were not up to 
standard. Once finished with his education, he decided after a visit 
to the Academy of Pine Arts in Vienna to pursue a career in painting. 
He was rejected twice from admission to the Academy's school once 
in 1908 and again in 1909.
THE FORMATIVE YEARS
Hitler spent the next five years wandering from job to job in 
Vienna. During these years he developed his hatred of the working 
class movement and socialism. Some historians have attributed his 
hatred of socialism to a possible superiority complex. In order for
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him to become involved in the working class movement he would 
have to admit he was on equal footing with working class people. His 
belief that he was better than most people would not allow him to 
accept that fact. He also formed his lasting hatred towards the 
Jewish people during these years. According to the historian Alan 
Bullock, "everything he ever said or wrote about the Jews is only a 
reflection of the anti-Semitic literature he read in Vienna before 
1914."9 He convinced himself there was a Jewish-Marxist world 
conspiracy to destroy and subdue the Aryan peoples.
During his yean in Vienna, Hitler also "discovered" many other 
political ideas and programs. Three parties in particular interested 
him. Prom the Austrian Social Democrats, Hitler derived the idea of 
mass party and mass propaganda. During this time he also realized 
the effectiveness of physical intimidation. Hitler's extreme German 
Nationalism, his anti-Socialism, his anti-Semitism, his hatred of the 
Hapsburgs and his program of reunion with Germany were taken 
from Georg von Schonerer's Pan-German Nationalists. However,
Hitler believed Schonerer had mistakenly concentrated on the middle 
class rather than masses. Also, Hitler believed the Pan-German 
Nationalists' anti-Catholic tendencies resulted in a split of the party 
instead of consolidating it against a common enemy as Hitler had 
argued for. Finally, from Karl Lunger's Christian Social Party Hitler 
learned to grasp the importance of political tactics. Rather than 
alienating any individual party, Lunger consolidated his forces and 9
9Alsn Buttock Hitter A Study In Tvrmnnv (New Yolk. 1971), 14.
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appealed to the masses. Thus, it is quite obvious that very little of 
Hitler's political philosophy was "new". Rather, Hitler's "greatness" 
lay in his ability to create a mass movement and secure power on die 
basis of these ideas.
In May, 1913 Hitler left Vienna permanently and traveled 
across the German frontier to Munich. Later in M ain K am pf. he 
would claim the years he spent in Munich were the happiest of his 
life. In reality, he probably left Vienna in order to escape the draft. 
He had not reported for military service since 1910 and the police 
were looking for him. During this time he read a number of works 
which simply reinforced his already strong political views.
When war broke out in June of 1914, Hitler's feelings were 
mixed. Hitler had despised the Archduke Fran?. Ferdinand for his 
pro-Slav views which Hider believed also to be anti-German- 
Austrian. At the same time, Hitler was relieved and comforted by 
die fact that Austria would now be compelled to fight on Germany's 
side and not be able to betray her ally. With these feelings intact, he 
addressed a faftnal petition to King Ludwig III of Bavaria asking to 
join a Bavarian regiment even though he was of Austrian descent.
His request of granted and he was enrolled in the 1st Company of die 
16th Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment. He was extremely excited 
and Riled with satisfaction. Now 1m  would have die chance to rid 
himself of the frustration and disappointment of the previous six 
years while at the same time involving himself in an organization 
that offered discipline, excitement, and a collective life. In U t i s
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K am pf he wrote, "Within a few days I was wearing that uniform 
which I was not to put off again for nearly six years."10
Hitler's years as a soldier during World War I were often 
looked upon nostalgically by him. He was a good enough soldier to 
be awarded the Iron Cross, Second Class in December of 1914. In 
1918, he was even awarded the Iron Cross, First Class .even though 
he was only a corporal. Hitler’s fellow soldiers did not look upon him 
with great favor due to his lack of interest in their affairs. All he 
concerned himself with was the war. While other men would take 
leave or spend time pursuing women, Hitler remained at the front 
only caring about the German victory. During his stay in a hospital at 
Beelitz he was very surprised by the contrast between the spirit of 
the Army at the Front and the lack of it coupled with anti-war 
propaganda at home. Later he would blame the lack of control and 
weakness of the German government as reasons why Germany lost 
the war. From the war Hitler drew two themes that he would refer 
to throughout his political career: Man of the People and Unknown 
Soldier of the First World War. Upon these themes rested his 
demagogy. The First World War confirmed the political beliefs that 
would remain with him throughout his life. Finally, the end of the 
First World War solidified Hitler's and the German Nationalists' "stab 
in the back theory”. This theory simply put stated that the German 
Army had been "stabbed in the back" by the German government, 
specifically the Social Democrats and Republican Parties. The rug had
10 Cited la Bullock, 23.
. *' J1*S
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been pulled out from under the Army when it was winning the war. 
Hitler would use this theory as propaganda against the Weimar 
government when he was trying to take power in die 1920‘s and 
30's. In reality, however, it was the German High Command, General 
Ludendorff specifically, who was responsible for taking the initiative 
to end the war.
HITLER AND THE POUNDING OP NATIONAL SOCIALISM
When the war finally ended, Hider was left without anything to 
do. However, on September 12, 1919, he attended his first meeting 
of the German Workers' Party which eventually evolved into the 
Nadonal Socialist Workers' Party. From the beginning he spent all 
his time trying to move his way up within the party ranks. He was 
one of die first members to suggest integrating the Preikotps1 1 into 
the Nasi Party's activities. He was also excellent at using propaganda 
to enlist new members into the Party. Hitler also involved the Party 
in provoking disturbances at political opponents' rallies and even led 
Party members in fierce street fights against rival socialist and 
communist groups.
1 ,The Frtikorps war* independent armed bands of voliiataan formed at the 
and of the war to maintain order and protect the eastern frontiers of Oermany 
but eventually became so involved with the Nationalist cause that they turned 
on the Republic. The Preikotps were the original predecessors to the S.A.
which eventually became the S.S. or tiestapo.
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Eventually Hitler made himself indispensable enough to claim 
absolute dictatorial powers over the Party. He worked harder than 
he ever did before. Looking back at this time in Main Kampf. he 
fondly remembered the early years of the Nazi movement. During 
these early years Hitler also began to make connections with men 
such as Rudolph Hess (while he was still in the Army) and Hermann 
Goering. These individuals would later help Hitler in his rise to 
pow er.
By 1922, National Socialism's popularity began to grow due to 
the German occupation of the Ruhr. Because of hyper-inflation, the 
mark collapsed also causing a rise in the popularity of National 
Socialism. Hitler took advantage of the situation and began to raise 
the number and size of his demonstrations. Unlike many of his 
socialist associates, Hitler looked to the overthrow of the Republic as 
necessary before exacting vengeance from the French. By 1923 
Hitler already realized it was necessary to use the S.A. (Brownshirts) 
to capture political power within the state before it would be 
possible to rebuild Germany's national and military power.
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THE BEER HALL PUTSCH
Hitler's unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch of November 8-9, 1923 
showed just how far he had come in four short years. In just a 
couple of hours on November 8, Hitler had transformed a tenuous 
political situation in Bavaria into a revolution through a simple bluff. 
He had never intended to revolt against the Army. Instead, he had 
hoped to win over Gustav von Kahr, a Bavarian right-wing politician 
who was appointed to quell the unstable political situation in 
Germany, and Lossow, the commanding officer in Bavaria. Both men 
were opposed to the existing Republic government in Berlin. 
However, when Hitler finally began his "revolution", both men 
backed down and would not participate. When they would not join 
the Nazi side, Hitler knew his chances were very slim.
By the morning of November 9, it was quite obvious that the 
coup attempt had gone awry. Hitler had enlisted Ludendorff in his 
scheme and the two of them led a last ditch effort to march against 
the Army. The revolution came to an end on the streets of Munich, 
where Hitler's S.A. marched in unison against the troops sent by 
Berlin. After very little fighting, the Nazis disbanded and 
surrendered. Hitler fled while Ludendorff successfully led too few 
troops on a successful purge through the German ranks. Goring was
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seriously injured in the skirmish but would recover to aid Hitler 
again.
At his trial. Hitler again proved his political adeptness. He was 
charged with political conspiracy and ironically a number of the 
witnesses brought to testify against him had been just as involved in 
the conspiracy as he was. The Bavarian government wanted to keep 
the trial as quiet as possible, but Hitler exploited the situation to the 
fullest. The coup attempt and trial were on the front page of most 
national and international newspapers. Rather than accusing the 
people testifying against him as co-conspirators. Hitler strategically 
claimed all responsibility for the coup. He, however, said it was not 
treason to revolt against a government that itself had committed 
treason against the government in 1918. Hitler's prosecutors were 
no match for his wit, and Hitler was given the minimum sentence of 
five years while Ludendorff was acquitted. Hitler was actually 
released from prison within nine months. During this time he wrote 
Mein K im of in which he told the world how he would successfully 
take over the German government. Also, Hitler would build up the 
failure of the Beer Hall Putsch into one of the great legends of the 
Nazi movement. In his early years, we can see the beginnings of the 
man who would be Fuehrer over the Third Reich.
THE YEARS OF WAITING
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Upon his release from jail, Hitler successfully "re-founded" the 
Nazi party. His two objectives were as follows: First he wanted to 
take absolute control of the Nazi party. Second, he wanted to build 
up the Party and make it a force within the German political system. 
Hitler had some problems revitalizing the movement because 
conditions in Germany had improved while he was in jail. Germany 
had joined the League of Nations, reparation payments had been 
reduced, and foreign troops had left the Ruhr. Thus, the mid to late 
20's were a period of slow growth and waiting for Hitler. He again 
tried to incorporate the S.A. into the Nazi party, but the S.A. was 
more concerned with military rather than political operations. Not 
until Hitler found a true leader in Heinrich Himmler could he get 
what he wanted from the S.A. (By the time this group became what 
Hitler hoped for they were known as the black-shirted S.S.) What 
Hitler wanted was an instrument to enforce his leadership over the 
Nazi Party and eventually over the German nation.12 1
1 information for this tub-chapter was taken from Bullock.
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THE RISE OP NATIONAL SOCIALISM
Over the s e tt  couple of years the Nazi Party eventually grew 
into a force large enough to play a rote in German politics. To try to 
dismiss Hitter and the Nazi Party's popularity as an aberration or 
fluke in history due to extreme circumstances is not only wrong but 
dangerous. It completely dismisses the importance of ideas.
National Socialism had three very appealing qualities to the 
masses living in Germany in the early 1930's. P in t of all, it was 
resolutely anti-Marxist and nationalistic. This appealed to the 
greater part of the German population who was traditionally 
nationalistic and had a love of the military in their blood. The Nazi 
party was also young, energetic, and optimistic. Hitter is often 
incorrectly painted as a reactionary. If anyone was a reactionary it 
was Churchill and not Hitler. Hitler was a revolutionary who was 
looking towards the future. Churchill was the one hoping to save the 
democracies of dm past. Hitter's Nazi party embodied the 
revolutionary spirit that was bom in the inter*war years. All over 
Europe revolution was brewing whether it was the revolution of 
nations or in technology. The new ideas of men such as Alex Junger 
(his famous work was Copse 12S1 were spreading throughout Europe. 
By 1936, 60% of German children were to belong to Nazi youth
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groups. Hitler had realized German children were m e of his best 
targets for enlistment into the Nazi movement. Finally, National 
Socialism opposed the conservative traditional viewpoint of 
supporting special interest and large corporations. In other words, 
Hitler played to the masses who were no longer willing to go without 
while large corporations were being supported by the government. 
These reasons help explain the popularity of the Nazi Party.13
There exists a number of schools of thought on how the Nazi's 
eventually rose to power. Some historians have blamed the Social 
Democrats for lack of opposition while others have blamed the 
French for imposing the Treaty of Versailles. Since the purpose of 
this paper does not involve finding a final answer, we shall simply 
look at the events that led up to the Nazi seizure of power. By the 
early 1930’s, the German government had reached a stalemate. 
During these years times grew more difficult and Nazi support grew 
larger. Between 1930 and 1932, the Nazis campaigned harder than 
ever and used their S.A. and S.S. troops for the purposes 
ofintimidatioa. By the end of '32, the Nazi Party had become the 
largest party in Germany with the Social Democrats finishing second 
in number of seats in the Reichstag. Rather than trying to take 
power by force as he attempted to do during the Putsch, Hitler chose 
to use this victory to obtain power legally and then have his 
revolution. The Chancellor of Oermany was Franz von Papen, a
J3The information in the proceeding paragraph is a compilation of 
information I learned while taking History 313: Buropc From 1919-1939 with 
Professor Friusche.
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Nationalist Conservative who was appointed by President 
Hindenburg with the support of Adolf Hitler.
HITLER S "SEIZURE" OF POWER
By January of 1933, von Papen could not And any support for 
his government. Hie government was falling apart and as a last 
measure Hindenburg chose to appoint Hitler as Chancellor with von 
Papen as Vice-Chancellor. Many individuals in the government 
believed Hitler could be manipulated to meet their needs. Their 
hopes were soon vanquished. Hitler used this opportunity to seize 
total control of Germany for himself and the Nazi Party. Within a 
few days Goering took over the police for the Nazis and used them to 
rid Germany of all Nazi opposition. Hitler used the burning of the 
Reichstag building on February 27 to call for a wholesale state of 
emergency. On February 28 Hindenburg signed a document which in 
effect turned Germany into the police state it would be until the end 
of World War II. From this point on, Hitler would use his powers as 
Chancellor to intrude Nazi propaganda and bureaucracy into all 
aspects of German life. None of the proceeding information, however,
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should suggest A it most Germans were dissatisfied with the 
litnttion. Even though the Nazis only had 44% of the p la te r  vote, 
h it popular support n ay  have even hem  greater because a number 
of parties sympathetic to the Nazi cause had received a substantial 
number of votes. Thus, Hitler did not really "seize" power. Rather he 
legally obtained it through the political process and solidified his 
position with the support of most of the German population. It is 
interesting to note that even in 195S, more than half the German 
people looked back on Hitler's Chancellorship from '33 to the 
outbreak of WWII in a nostalgic manner as positive times in their 
liv es.14 Thus, the theory that the German people were somehow 
tricked or forced into allowing Hitler to take power simply is not 
persuasive.
14 William Sheridaa Allen. The M il o f  P o w e r  (New York. 1965)
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CHURCHILL S EARLY WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
Daily Mail Yean
Now that we have examined both Hitler and Churchill's lives 
leading up to the point at which each of them first began to 
"discover" the other, let us begin to examine Winston Churchill's 
early writings and speeches concerning Adolf Hitler. From 1932 to 
1939 Winston had the opportunity to write for a number of London 
newspapers. In these articles we can see the development of his 
views towards Germany, the Nazi Party, and Adolf Hitler in 
particular. Over the next seven to eight years Churchill would write 
for a number of different newspapers including the Daily Mail, the 
Evenina Standard, and the Daily Telegraph. He would write for the 
M ail from 1932 to 1933, for the Standard from 1936 to 1937, and 
finish his early career as a journalist with the Telegraph from 1938 
to 1939.
Over this extended period of time Churchill would make what 
appears to be a number of contradictory statements about Germany 
and Hitler. However, at closer look it becomes obvious that his 
arguments and views remained consistent over this period of time. 
Even when Winston would write something "admirable" about Hitler, 
it was always with great hesistancy and in hope of maintaining good
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relations with Germany. As a number of private documents of 
Churchill's suggest, he never really liked Hitler and eventually came 
to despise him. He probably expressed himself more mildly in a 
number of articles in o n to  not to offend the German government or 
Hitler himself. Hie last thing Churchill wanted to be blamed for was 
worsening Anglo-German relations. He even went so far as to tone 
down one of his articles on Hitler when he published a collection of 
his essays in a book entitled Great Contemporaries.
As quotations from a number of articles will show, Churchill 
was definitely one of the first writers and politicians in England to 
express wariness of German rearmament. He was at first criticized 
by the British press and government for his opinions. A 
disagreement between himself and The Evening Standard is what 
caused him to leave the paper to write for The Daily Telegraph in 
late 1937. Eventually, as it became more apparent that Hitler would 
not stop his quest to expand the German empire, Churchill's peers 
came to see things his way. By this time it was too late. England 
would be forced into war with a Germany that was far better 
equipped and trained than were British forces. But now we are 
jumping ahead. It is time to go back and start at the beginning.
Although no exact date is known, Winston Churchill probably 
first heard of Adolf Hitler after the Beer Hall Putsch failure in 1923. 
There is, however, no written record of his opinion on Hitler for a 
few more years. One of the first pieces of evidence we have of 
Churchill's opinions on Hitler comes from the report of the counselor 
of the German embassy in Britain. Churchill had attended an affair
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at the German embasay in September of 1930 at which time he 
•poke to the German counselor. The counselor limit have found 
Churchill's words important enough to report back to Berlin. The 
report read, "Hitler of course declared he does not intend starting a 
world war but Churchill believes that Hitler and his followers will 
grasp the first chance to resort to arms again."15 Two years later 
Hitler would take over as Fuehrer of Germany and begin 
rearmament. This would not be the last of Churchill's warnings.
In the summer of 1932, Churchill had his first opportunity to 
meet Hitler. He would later recall the event in his memoirs, stating 
that while staying in Germany, he had been asked by Hitler's social 
secretary, a man named Hanfstaengl, if he would like to meet the 
"Fuehrer". The man told Churchill it could easily be arranged 
because Hitler frequented the Regina Hotel, which happened to be 
the hotel Churchill was staying. Churchill agreed graciously and the 
two men sat down to dinner. During the course of their conversation 
Churchill happened to say:
Why is your chief so violent about the Jews? I can quite 
understand being angry with Jews who have done wrong 
or are against the country, and I understand resisting 
them if they try to monopolise power in any walk of life; 
but what is the sense of being against a man simply
15Cited in Lukacs. 39.
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became of bis birth? How can any man help how he is 
b o rn?1®
The man most have repeated what Churchill said to Hitler 
because on the following day the man returned with a message from 
Hitler. The Fuehrer would be unable to meet with Winston because 
of other business. John Lukacs, author of The Duel, suggests this may 
have been to Churchill's advantage. Hitler had a knack for 
perceiveing the weaknesses of people he met. Had Hitler met 
Churchill in '32, he may have understood him better. Churchill 
would again find himself with the opportunity to meet Hhler in 
1937. Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German ambassador to London, 
invited Churchill to meet Hit'er on two separate occasions. This time 
is was Churchill who refused the invitations. After World War II, 
Churchill explained his reasons:
I would gladly have met Hitler with the authority of 
Britain behind me. But as a private individual I should 
have placed myself and my country at a disadvantage, if  
I agreed with the Dictator-host, I should have misled him.
If I had disagreed, he would have been offended, and I 
would have been accused of spoiling Anglo-German
^W inston  S. Churchill Memoir* o f the Second W orld W ir. (Bolton, 1987), 42.
41
relations. Therefore I declined, or rather let lapse, both 
inv itations.17
As circumstances turned out, Churchill understood Hitler far 
better than Hitler understood Churchill.
Winston wrote one of his first articles for die Daily Mail on May 
26, 1932. The topic was the Disarmament Conference at Geneva. In 
the article he argued against the plea by Britain's Foreign Secretary 
in favor of European disarmament. He asked the important question, 
it likely that France with less than forty millions, faced Germany 
with sixty millions, and double the number of young men coming to 
military age every year, is going to deprive herself of the mechanical 
aids and appliances on which she relies to prevent a fourth invasion 
in little more than a hundred years?"18 Churchill did not agree with 
the popular opinion throughout Europe that France and Germany 
should be on equal footing militarily. He believed such a situation 
would promote war rather than deter it.
Only four days after Churchill's article was publiihed, Dr. 
Bruening was replaced as German Chancellor by Count von Papen. 
Although the Nazi leaders were not invited to join the new 
Government, von Papen hoped that with Hitler's rapport he could 
remain in power for several years. Also, on June 19 provincial 
elections were held and the Nazi vote increased from 37% to 44%.19
,7Cited in Lukact, 36.
18Winston S. Churchill Daily Mail (London. May 26, 1932)
,9 Allen and Professor Fritzsche.
Following this electoral success, Nazi bands attacked and killed a 
number of their Social Democrat and Communist opponents. The 
attacks included not only mm, but also women and children. Thus, 
Churchill's warnings four days earlier were not unfounded. Changes 
were occurring in Germany that would lead to war in Europe.
On October 17 Churchill published another Article in the D aily 
M ail this time supporting Simon's new position that the disarmament 
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were still binding upon Germany, 
and that Germany had no right to rearm. In the article he wrote 
Simon's firm stand had "done more to consolidate peace in Europe 
than any words spoken on behalf of Great Britain for some years"; he 
had "raised the hand of warning in the interests of peace." Simon's 
firm stand was essential because according to Churchill, every right 
wing party in Germany was trying to win votes "by putting up the 
boldest front against the foreigner". Hitler, Churchill pointed out, was 
trying to "outdo Papen" by campaigning on a platform that called for 
immediate German rearmament regardless of the Treaty of 
V ersailles.20 Just as in 1930, Churchill was quite aware of Hitler's 
plan’s to rearm Germany. Unlike many of his contemporaries, 
Churchill realized Hitler was serious and eventually could reach a 
position in government where he could carry out his plan. Winston 
also realized such a plan could only have one aim, war.
On November 17, Churchill published his next article in the 
Dally Mail. Thl« time, he asked for the British government to devise
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2°W inston S. Churchill Daily Mali (London. October 17, 1932)
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•  policy in case of another European war. "If Geneva fails,” he wrote, 
”let the National Government propose to Parliament measures 
necessary to place our Air Force in such a condition of power and 
efficiency that it will not be worth anyone's while to come and kill 
our women and children in hope that they may blackmail us into 
surrender.”21
On the same day Churchill's article was published, von Papen 
resigned as Chancellor, being unable to form a government. Two 
days later, on November 19, Adolf Hitler was asked by President 
Hindenburg to serve in the Government of von Papen's successor. 
Hitler refused, replying he would only serve a Government of which 
he himself was Chancellor. Soon, he would get his wish.
Four days later, on the 24th of November, Churchill made a 
speech in the House of Commons again warning against the ever 
growing strength of Germany. Almost seven years before Munich, 
Churchill pointed out that every demand made by Germany which 
was conceeded to "has been followed immediately by a fresh 
demand.” He stated that even though the Germans were only asking 
for equality of arms with France, that in itself spelt danger for 
Europe. Now it is time to let Churchill's prose speak for itself:
Do not delude yourselves. Do not let His Majesty's 
Government believe-I am sure they do not believe-that 
all that Germany is asking lor is equal status. I believe
21 Winston S. Churchill Daily Mali (London, November 17, 1932)
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the refined term now is equal qualitative status by 
indefinitely deferred stages. That is not what Germany is 
seeking. All these bands of sturdy Teutonic youths, 
marching through the streets and roads of Germany, with 
the light of desire in their eyes to suffer for their 
Fatherland, are not looking for status. They are looking 
for weapons, and, when they have the weapons, believe 
me they will then ask for the return of lost territories 
and lost colonies, and when that demand is made it 
cannot fail to shake and possibly shatter to their 
foundations every one of the countries I have mentioned. 
(France, Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia)22
The purpose of including such a long passage can be 
understood when closely looking at what Churchill wrote. In these 
eleven lines Churchill almost spells out Hitler's actions over the 
following seven years . Churchill's accuracy is almost uncanny.
Hitler did rearm as Churchill predicted. Furthermore, after rearming 
Hitler did ask for the return of lost territories and colonies and 
eventually went to war over these demands.
Let us now jump a little under two years into the future. 
Winston was still writing for the Daily Mail, but he had taken up a 
nrw cause. Churchill was now concerned with Britain's air policy or
22M«rtin Gilbert Winitnn S. Churchill: The Prophet of Truth- (Boston, 1977),
450.
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rather the lade of one. He (tether insitied that Qermaay's Air Force 
was growing at an alarming rale. On July 9, 1934, Chavehill 
published a rather lengthy article in the in which he
described his position. He wrote:
I marvel at die complacency of Ministers in the face 
of the frightful experiences through which we have all so 
newly passed. I lode with wonder upon our thoughtless 
crowds disporting themselves in the summer sunshine, 
and upon this unheeding House of Commons, which seems 
to have no higher function than to cheer a Minister; and 
all the while, across the North Sea, a terrible process is 
astir. GERMANY IS ARMING.23
Parliamentary opinion was to change but at an alarmingly slow 
rate. One prediction had die British Air Force fully prepared for war 
in eight years time, 1942.24 Almost a full year later, in 1935, 
Churchill was still arguing his point. In an article written for the 
iw tv  u «ii published on April 4, 1935, Churchill pleaded with the 
Government to make rearmament first priority. By this time he was 
not only concerned with die Air Force, but with rearmament in 
general. He stated that British industries should already be 
preparing to switch over to munitions production. Winston further
^Winston S. Churchill n«iiv m«ii (London, July 9, 1934), 550.
3*Cited in Gilbert Tha Ptnnhat nf Truth 552.
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pointed out that this action had already been taken by every country 
in Europe "to an extent and with a refinement which it at once 
astounding and alarming." Churchill further wrote:
The political sensation of course is the statement by 
Hitler that his air force is already as strong as ours.(1935)
This completely stultifies everything that Baldwin has 
said and incidentally vindicates all the assertions that I 
have made. I expect in fact he is really much stronger 
than we are. Certainly they will soon be at least two 
times greater than we are so that Baldwin's terms that 
we should not be less than any other country is going to 
be falsified.: s
What is so amazing about Churchill's appeals is not only that 
they are based on extremely accurate predictions, but that Churchill 
had such a hard time getting anyone to listen to him. It is interesting 
to speculate on why this was so. Maybe they simply did not believe 
Hitler's Germany had die capabilities to do what Churchill said it was 
doing. More likely, however, is his peers did not w ant to believe 
what Churchill was saying. The picture of reality Churchill was 
painting was not a pretty one.
^W inston  S. Churchill P ally  Mall (London, April 4, 193S), 630.
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THE STOAND ARTICLE
Now we shall address an article in which Churchill specifically 
wrote about Hitler. The original publication of this article in S trand 
magazine caused such a controversy in Germany and in Britain that 
when Churchill decided to include it in a compilation of his work to 
be published in 1937, he toned the article down in order not to 
offond Germany at time when Anglo-German relations were strained 
enough. The original article was published in November, 1935. In 
the article entitled "Hitler and His Choice", Churchill presented the 
two paths on which Hitler might choose to take Germany. The first 
path was one of peace. The second was one one of war. Winston 
w rites:
We cannot tell whether Hitler will be the man who wiU 
once again let loose upon the world another war in which 
civilazation will irretrievably succumb, or whether he 
will go down in history as the man who restored honor 
and peace of mind to the great Germanic nation and 
brought it back serene, helpful and strong, to the 
forefront of the European family circle.26
Mwiastoi S. Churchill Own Contampor.ri,,. (h«w York, 1 9 3 7 ), 2 2 3 -2 3 2 .
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Churchill went on to point out that the future w u  •  mystery; 
but if he were to judge Hitler on the past, the second path was the 
more likely one Hitler would choose. Hitler’s political career had 
been characterized by violence, hatred, and vengeance. The 
following rather lengthy passage draws a very accurate picture of 
Churchill's views on Hitler's career:
Hitherto, Hitler's triumphant career has been borne 
onwards, not only by a passionate love of Germany, but 
by currents of hatred so intense AS TO SEAR THE SOULS 
OF THOSE WHO SWIM UPON THEM, (emphasis is mine)
Hatred of the French is the first of these currents, and we 
have only to read Hitler's book, M ein Kxmnf. to see that 
the French are not the only foreign nation against whom 
the anger of rearmed Germany may be turned.
But the internal stresses are even more striking.
The Jews, supposed to have contributed, by a disloyal and 
pacifist influence, to the collapse of Germany at the end 
of the Great War, were also deemed to be the main prop 
of communism and the authors of defeatist doctrines in 
every form. Therefore, the Jews of Germany, a 
community numbered by many hundreds of thousands, 
were to be stripped of all power, driven from every 
position in public and social life, expelled from the 
professions, silenced in the Press, and declared a foul and 
odious race.
49
The twentieth century hat witnessed with surprise, 
not merely the promulgation of these ferocious doctrines, 
but their enforcement with brutal vigor by the 
Government and the populace. No past services, no 
proved patriotism, even wounds sustained in war, could 
procure immunity for persons whose only crime was that 
their parents had brought them into the world. Every 
kind of persecution, grave or petty, upon the world- 
famous scientists, writers, and composers at the top down 
to the wretched little Jewish children in the national 
schools, was practiced, was glorified, and is still being 
practiced and glorified.
A similar proscription fell upon socialists and 
communists of every hue. The Trade Unionist and liberal 
intelligentsia are equally smitten. The slightest criticism 
is an offence against the State. The courts of justice, 
though allowed to function in ordinary cases, are 
superceded for every form of political offence by so- 
called people's courts composed of ardent Nazis.
Side by side with the training grounds of the new 
armies and the great aerodromes, the concentration 
camps pock-mark die German soil. In these thousands of 
Germans coerced and cowed into submission to the 
irresistible power of the Totalitarian State."27
27Ihid., 225-232.
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II is quite amazing how well Churchill understood Hitler and 
what he was doing in Germany. While others turned away and did 
not want to see, Churchill almost completely understood Hitler's 
motives and actions. Towards the end of the article Churchill again 
asked the question: would Hitler's "hatreds" and "antagonisms" be 
cast aside under the mellowing influences of success. Even though 
Churchill mentions that those people who had met Hitler had found 
him to have an "agreeable manner", he further pointed out that while 
Hitler spoke "words of reassurance", in Germany itself:
the great wheels revolve; the rifles, the cannon the tanks, 
the shot and shell, the air bombs, the poison-gas 
cylinders, the aeroplanes, the submarines, and now the 
beginnins of a fleet flow in every broadening streams 
from the already largely war-mobilized arsenals and 
factories of Germany.28
Writing about Hitler specifically, Churchill concluded, "What 
manner of man is this grim figure who has performed these superb 
toils [meaning the raising up of Germany] and loosed these frightful 
evils [meaning Hitler's persecutions and terrors]."* 29 This article so 
infuriated the German government that Hitler himself made a public 
statement in which he said, "What is to be the fate of the Anglo-
UlkiA., 225-232.
29IhhL. 225-232.
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German naval agreement if the writer of this article is to be the 
Minister of the British Navy?"30 Some historians have claimed that 
in 1937, Churchill's opinions swayed in favor of trying to maintain 
peace with Germany. They point to the fact that Churchill chose to 
tone down his article when he decided to include it among many 
articles in his book Great C ontem poraries The problem with this 
theory is that the evidence does not support it. A close examination 
of the reprinted original article shows very little change. Not one of 
the passages previously quoted was emitted. All that Churchill 
added were a few  more lines in which he expressed the hope that 
Hitler would strive for peace.
Some historians have also pointed to the article Churchill wrote 
for the Evening S tandard on September 17, 1937, to show that 
Churchill's views on Hitler were moderating. In this article Churchill 
appealed to Hitler asking him to abandon the persecution of the lews, 
Protestants, and Catholics. He went on to say that without such 
measures, Britain would be unable to support the return of German 
colonies or give Germany the financial aid it was requesting.
Churchill ended die article on a conciliatory note. "One may dislike 
Hitler's system and yet admire his patriotic achievement," Churchill 
wrote. "If our country were defeated I hope we should find a 
champion as indomitable to restore our courage and lead us back to 
our place among the nations." Churchill then appealed to Hitler to
30CU®d In Oilbert n »  o f Truth. 612.
52
become "the Hiller of p e a c e . ”31 Even though these words indicate 
some change in Winston's views, two private letters form Churchill to 
two friends at this time suggest that Winston's opinions towards 
Hitler had remained constant.
The first letter was written to Lord Linlithgow on September 
23. In the letter he informed Linlithgow that he thought it was quite 
unlikely that Hitler would mellow and that he believed the 
"situation" between England and Germany was growing more serious. 
He pointed out that by 1938 the German Air Force and Army would 
be relatively stronger than the British and French. Churchill 
concluded the letter with the following forecast: "I do not believe in a 
major war this year because the French Army at present is as large 
as that of Germany and far more mature. But next year and the year 
after may carry these Dictator-ridden countries to the cllimax of 
their armament and of their domestic embarassments. We shall 
certainly need to be ready by then."* 32
In the second private letter, written on October 23, 1937, to his 
Mend of forty years, the 7th Marquess of Londonderry, Churchill 
wrote, "You cannot expect English people to be attracted by the 
brutal intolerances of Nazidom." He went on to say, "that when the 
German Government speaks of friendship with England, what they 
mean is that we shall give them back their former colonies, and also 
agree to their having a free hand so far as we are concerned in 
Central and Southern Europe." Churchill pointed out that such
^Winston S. Churchill *v <■*« (London. 1939), 155-138.
32Cited in Gilbert Thu Pmphat of Truth. 580.
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concessions would result in the German takeover of Austria and 
Czechoslavakia. He wrote, "It would certainly not be in our interest 
to connive at such policies of aggression." Winston further stated 
that "it would be contrary to the whole tide of British and United 
States opinion for us to facilitate the spread of Nazi tyranny over 
countries which now have a considerable measure of democratic 
freedom ".33
Neither piece of correspondence suggests any marked change 
in Churchill's attitude. On the contrary, Winston was just as wary of 
Hitler and Germany in 1937 as he ever was. He even went as far as 
predicting war between Britain and Germany. Phrases like "Nazi 
tyranny" and "policies of agression" are not words founded in 
m oderation.
The year 1933 saw an overwhelming victory for the 
Conservatives in the General Election. They had secured 432 seats as 
against 131 for Labour, and a mere 21 for the Liberals. One of the 
main debates that raged throughout the election was over 
rearmament. Needless to say, Churchill had very strong opinions on 
this issue. He found himself in direct opposition to Stanley Baldwin. 
Baldwin declared in a campaign speech on October 31 "I give you my 
word there will be no great armaments.”34 Churchill, by contrast, in 
urging greater rearmament, wrote in the Daily Mail on November 12, 
"I do not feel that people realize at all how near and how grave are
33lhld., 381.
34Ihid., 347.
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the dangers of a world explosion."39 Thus, when Baldwin had 
secured his victory, he did not ask Churchill to join the Government. 
At least this allowed Churchill to continue his articles in which he 
critisized the Government for not taking a strong enough initiative to 
rearm .
THE EVENING STANDARD YEARS
Now it is time to regress to the point at which we started this 
"quick look into the future." We left Winston in November of 1933 
just after finishing his article for Strand magazine. By March of the 
following year, Churchill was again campaigning for an increase in 
British efforts to remilitarize. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer at this time, had approved a plan to set up a special 
financial committee to make sure that the money allocated to 
defense spending was spent wisely. Churchill approved of 
Chamberlain's efforts but believed they were too little too late. On 
March 7, 1936 Hitler sent his troops into the Rhineland, the German 
sovereign territory which had been demilitarised by the victorious 
Allies in 1919. This action simply confirmed in Churchill's mind that 
Hitler was preparing for war. In a speech before the House of 
Commons on March 10, Churchill said:
"W inston S. Churchill m iy  Mail (London, November 12, 193S)
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T h a t to •  general impression that we are overhauling 
Germany now. We started late hut we are making up for 
lost time, and evey month our mtacive position will 
improve. That is a delusion. The contrary is true. All 
this year and probably for many months next year 
Germany will be outstripping us more and more. Even if 
our new programs were punctually executed, we shall be 
relatively much worse off at the end of this year than we 
are now, in spite of our utmost exertions. The 
explanation of this grievous fact lies in the past.36
Churchill further argued that British diplomacy was suffering 
because of the nation's military weakness. Churchill had always 
sought to be conciliatory during negotiations, but at the same time he 
wished to negotiate from a position of strength. Three days later 
Churchill published an article in the Evening Standard in which he 
argued that the only solution to the weakness of the individual states 
including Britain was to re-establish "a reign of law in Europe". He 
further insisted that without such action, Europe would enter a 
"horrible, dull, remorseless drift to war in 1937 and 1938." According 
to Winston, there was only one way to maintain peace: "the assembly 
of overwhelming force, moral and physical, in support of
3*Cited in Gilbert A Life. 552.
56
to ttr i ir to iil  law."37 Thus, Churchill was calling attention to the
Great Britain and the rest of the world were and 
would he making years before historians began to analyze the 
actions A m could have prevented World War II.
Churchill continued his protests throughout 1936 in a series of 
articles written for the B v l> «  Three of the articles
published in May of 1936 were entitled: "How Germany is Arming", 
"Our Navy Must be Stronger", and "Organise our Supplies'. In the 
first article, Churchill attempted to support his claim that in 1935 
alone, Germany spent L800,000,000 sterling on warlike preparation. 
Even though the German government did not prepare yearly 
budgets, Churchill used a number of statistical devices to prove his 
thesis. He concludes the article by stating,
All this (money and labor) has gone into making the most 
destructive war weapons and war arrangements that 
have ever been known. What is it all for? Certainly it is 
not for fun. Something quite extraordinary is afoot. All 
the signals are set for danger. The red lights flash 
through the gloom. Let peaceful folk beware. It is a time 
to pay attention and to be well prepared.38
37ciwd in Oilbeit T%m Prnnhal o f Truth. 728.
38CUed in Churchill i t f  by Stop 16.
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th e  second article addressed the problem that the British Navy 
was being allowed to grow weaker. The article was divided into two 
sections. The first section critisized the Anglo-German Navel 
Agreement of 1935. Churchill correctly pointed out that by means of 
this agreement Britain in effect had allowed Germany to ignore the 
Treaty of Versailles and start rebuilding her fleet. Considering that 
Germany had no real navy, building one one-third the size of Great 
Britain's gave the German's a definite advantage when one 
considered the fact that they were already rearming all other 
brunches of their military. Furthermore, Churchill pointed out that in 
the future, when Germany's Navy reached one-third the size of Great 
Britain's, Hitler might decide that the one-third tonnage requirement 
was no longer applicable. (The Treaty was to be denounced by Hitler 
on April 28, 1939.) Thus, Churchill again correctly predicted Hitler's 
actions. Also, just as before, very few people were listening to 
Churchill's warnings. The second half of the article was less 
important for our purposes. It simply called for a pact between the 
United States and Great Britain in which both agreed to build fleets 
large enough to protect each other.
The third article discussed Britain's "urgent need for creating a 
Ministry of Munitions."39 In this rather brief article Churchill argued 
that Parliament had been delaying passing legislation which would 
allow industry to organise itself in case it would need to switch 
production from peactime to wartime supplies. He points out that
39Ihid.. 21
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lack of Nttto was not the problem. The Chancellor of the Excequer 
hid been preparing for such a situation for years and only the United 
States was better prepared economically to bear the burden than 
Britain. As happened so many times before, very few people in 
England listened to Winston. Not until April, 1939, did the 
Government create a Ministry of Supply.
Thus, in all three articles we see a common theme. Churchill 
warned Great Britain and the world of the rise of Nazi power. He 
pleaded with Parliament to prepare for war by rearming. He further 
argued that Great Britain should not give in to Hitler's "requests" to 
be allowed to rearm. On both points, Churchill was ignored. The 
results are obvious. Just as Churchill predicted, Hitler rearmed while 
Britain and the rest of the world waited. When war broke out,
Europe was unprepared and almost lost the war in the early months. 
Had it not been for the vast economic resources of the United States, 
Europe might have fallen into one of the darkest eras in world 
history. One can argue that this risk could have been avoided had 
Great Britain and the rest of the world heeded Churchill's early 
w arnings.
This is a simplistic interpretation of the events, but it is meant 
to clearly show one possible interpretation. There was obviously 
some rearmament going on in Britain from 1934 on, though it was 
not at all near the rate Churchill sought. Some historians have 
argued Churchill overestimated the rate of German rearmament.40
40O ilbert suggests th is point w ithout referring to any historians specifically.
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In response to that theory, Churchill did statistically support his 
numbers on German rearmament in his article entitled "How 
Germany is Arming". After publishing these three articles, Churchill 
continued to plead with Great Britain and the world even though 
very few listened to him.
In a public speech he gave on June 20, 1936, he explained why 
he continued to argue in favor of rearmament even though,
I (Churchill) have been mocked and censured as a 
scaremonger and even a warmonger, by those whose 
complacency and inertia have brought us all nearer to 
war and war nearer to us all. But I have the comfort of 
knowing I have spoken the truth and done my duty.
Indeed I am more proud of the long series of speeches 
which I have made on defense and foreign policy in the 
last four years than of anything I have ever been able to 
do, in all my forty years of public life.41
Three weeks later Winston gave another speech in which he 
quoted the Minister of Defense, Sir Thomas Inskip, who said that 
Britain had "reached the planning stage" for war production.
Churchill then went on to point out that Germany had "finished her 
planning stage three years ago, and her whole industry has long been 
adapted on an unexampled scale for war." Churchill believed it was
41Ched in Gilbert A Life. 539.
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hit duly to "to keep up a remorseless pressure on the Government to 
face the realities of the position, and to make exertions appropriate 
to our needs.”42 He accomplished this by writing a numerous 
number of articles and giving speeches throughout 1936.
Winston was even able to expand his message throughout 
Europe with the help of a thirty-three year old Hungarian Jew,
Emery Reves, who had set up a press service in Paris. The purpose 
of Reves’ service was to promote intemaitonal understanding and 
democratic values. Reves agreed to print Churchill's articles from the 
Evening Standard in newspapers throughout Europe. Churchill used 
this opportunity to urge all threatened states throughout Europe to 
band together against German aggression.
In an article entitled "The Gathering Storm” (Churchill would 
again use this title for one of the six volumes of his Memoirs of the 
Second World War series) Churchill briefly summed up the situation 
as he found it in Europe as of October 30, 1936. Germany was 
growing ever stronger while Britain was stagnant. By now Germany 
had twice as many men of military age as Prance. Its period of 
military service had increased from one year to two and its military 
expenditures had increased substantially. Churchill's tone in this 
article is desperate. He simply cannot understand why it was taking 
the British government so long to create a Ministry of Munitions. His 
tone can best be characterized by the question he ends the article 
w ith:
42lfcJA.539
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Are the members (of Parliament) going to discharge their 
responsibilities to the Empire and to the nation, and 
earnestly associate themselves with the business of 
national defense? Or will they simply shrug their 
shoulders, admit their impotency, and await in docile 
resignation the impending teachings of events?4 3
Churchill finally took out his agression in one of his most 
famous and biting speeches given to Parliament on November 12, 
1936. In effect, he said to Parliament, "I told you sol” In the speech 
he began by giving the statistics of German military growth over the 
past two years. He then pointed out that all along he was trying to 
warn Parliament of exactly what Hitler and Germany were doing, but 
they had refused to listen and now they found themselves in the 
middle of a "nightmare". Churchill then proceeded to try to hammer 
the idea into the minds of the members of Parliament that a Ministry 
of Munitions was at this point no less than a necessity. Too many 
times in the past he reminded Parliament that they had been told all 
was proceeding according to plan. In prose that only Churchill could 
write, he responded to the First Lord of the Admiralty's assertion 
that everything was proceeding satisfactorily. 43
43Clted in Churchill Sum hv Sum. 65.
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'We are always reviewing the position.' Everything, he 
assured us, is entirely fluid. I am sure that that is true. 
Anyone can see what the position is. The Government 
simply cannot make up their minds, or they cannot get 
the Prime Minister to make up his mind. SO THEY GO ON 
IN STRANGE PARADOX, DECIDED ONLY TO BE UNDECIDED, 
RESOLVED TO BE IRRESOLUTe, ADAMANT FOR DRIFT, 
SOLID FOR FLUIDITY, ALL POWERFUL TO BE IMPOTENT, 
(emphasis is mine) So we go on preparing for months 
and years-precious, perhaps vital to the greatness of 
Britain-far the locusts to eat. They will say to me, 'A 
Minister of Supply is not necessary, for all is going well.'
I deny it. The position is satisfactory'. It is not true. 'All 
is proceeding according to plan.' We know what that 
m eans.44
44Wln«on S. Churchill rn» Tm h. m l Swe«t (Boston, 1989), 121.
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THE DAILY TELEGRAPH YEARS
Churchill began 1938 with the same outlook but with a new 
publication. The E vening  S tandard  had opposed Churchill's call for 
European nations to band together to deter Germany from aggression 
and had therefore cancelled his weekly articles. The Daily Telegraph 
a paper opposed to the Government's appeasement policy, and 
owned by Churchill's friend Lord Camrose, agreed to serve as 
Churchill's journalistic outlet.
In his first article for the T e le g ra p h , published on April 14, 
1938, Churchill commented on the fall in France four days earlier of 
Blum's second Government. By now tensions in Europe were 
increasing at an alarming rate. The scent of war was growing 
stronger. Churchill wrote, "If France broke, everything would break, 
and the Nazi domination of Europe, and potentially of a large part of 
the world, would seem inevitable."43 Churchill further added that he 
supported Edward Daladier, the new leader of France, and stressed 
the importance of a stable and firm French Government to peace in 
Europe. Winston pointed out how Hitler and Germany were using 
every means of propaganda to portray France as on the verge of
43Cited In Churchill Si*p by Step. 220.
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collapse. He urged the French military to stay on watch for any signs 
of German aggression.
The next article article Winston wrote for the Daily Telearanh 
was published on April 28. This time the subject he addressed was 
the set-back in British production of aircraft. He argued there was 
simply no reason why British factories should not be pouring out 
three times as many aircraft as they were doing. The Government 
had authorized the tripling in size of the Royal Air Force but no 
action was being taken to carry out their plan.46
On May 1 Churchill again addressed the problem of defense in 
a new series of political articles he was writing for News of the 
W orld. This time he called for an increase in the number of bombers. 
He pointed out that bombers could be used defensively as well as 
offensively. He suggested that if one in three German bombers were 
shot down during raids, the raiding would not go on for long because 
"eels are said to get used to skinning, but airmen do not get used to 
being killed".47 Also, an increase in British bombers would act as a 
deterrent against further Nazi air strikes. Winston concluded the 
article with an appeal to all the readers to try and influence their 
friends and representatives to realize that the situation was drastic.
Churchill was astonished at how few people took his warnings 
seriously. Even the News of the World continued to publish articles 
assuring its readers that all was well. In a private and secret letter 
to Major Percy Davies on June 5, Churchill wrote, "There is at present
46Cited in Churchill Stop hv Sup 224.
47Cited in Gilbert Th« Pmptmt Qf Tnith. 937.
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time an almost total absence of defence, apart from the RAF for our 
cities and vulnerable points." Churchill went on to point out that the 
RAF "is at present less than one-third of die German Air Force, and 
the rate of production is at present less than one-third. The German 
know our position very accurately and it is our own people who live 
in a 'Fools Paradise'".48
Four days later Winston published another article in the D aily 
Telegraph. This time he addressed Inskip's statement to the House 
of Commons on May 30 that in the event of war, Britain would 
institute a draft. Churchill approved of the measure but believed 
that such a statement should have been made "witii all formality, in 
words carefully chosen, and upon a great occassion."49 He argued 
that the prospect of an immense British Army was one of the great 
deterrents to aay aggressor. By giving the statement more weight by 
choosing the right moment to make the announcement, Churchill 
believed Germany might think twice about stating  a European war.
Churchill's next concern w*. the future security of 
Caechoslovakia. On a number of previous occassions he had w aned 
that a growing Germany would eventually set its sights on the 
Sudetenland. In an article published on June 23, 1938, for die D aily 
Telegraph. Churchill specifically addressed his concern for 
Czechoslovakia's future. He warned Germany that if attacked, 
Czechoslovakia would not have to struggle alone. France, Russia, and
4>lhid.. 944.945.
49lhid., 943.
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eventually Britain would be drawn in to help her. Winston went on 
to persuade the Sudeten Germans that their future was more secure 
within a free and tolerant Czechoslovakia, than "swallowed whole by 
Berlin and reduced to shapeless pulp by those close-grinding 
mandibles of the Gestapo."s0
The year 1938 also saw the annexation of Austria by Hitler's 
Germany on March 11. Hitler had been putting pressure on Austria 
to become part of the German Reich for some time. In response to 
this pressure, the Austrian Prime Minister, Kurt von Schushnigg, had 
called a plebiscite; Austrians would be asked to vote for or against 
preserving their independence. Hitler ignored the vote and within a 
twenty-four hour period on March 11 German troops crossed the 
Austrian border. Anyone considered hostile to the new Nazi regime 
was simply arrested and sent off to concentration camps. Tens of 
thousands of liberals, democrats, socialists, and Jews fled the country.
Churchill continued his attacks on Hitler's Germany throughout 
the summer of 1938. This time Churchill chose to attack Nazi policy 
towards the "citizens" of Austria after the Nazi takeover. The Nazi 
policy of demeaning and torturing Jewish "citizens" had been 
incorporated into Austrian policy. On July 6, in a further article in 
the Daily T eleyraph , Churchill strongly critisized the German 
Government for the cruel and ruthless action it had taken against the 
Jewish people in Austria. He wrote, "It is easy to ruin and persecute 
the Jews, to steal their private property; to drive them out of every
50Cited in Churchill Stap hy Step 244.
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profession and employment, to compel Jewish ladies to scrub the 
pavements; and to maroon clusters of helpless refugees on islands in 
the Danube; and these sports continue to give satisfaction.”91
By August Churchill had completely turned his concerns to the 
situation in Czechoslovakia. By then Hitler seemed determined to 
incite the Sudeten Germans to make extreme, unacceptable demands, 
hoping to create a situation of which Germany would eventually be 
able to take territorial advantage. Germany by now had moved over 
one and a half million troops between the Nuremberg and Czech 
firontier. Hitler had claimed that he was only holding the usual 
peace-time manoeuvres. Churchill, unlike a number of British 
politicians, did not buy Hitler's ploy. In an article published in the 
Daily Telegraph on August 18, Winston wrote, "it would be only 
common prudence for other countries besides Germany to have these 
same manoeuvres at the same time and to place their precautionary 
forces in such a position that if the optimists" who claimed their was 
no threat "were wrong," the Governments who shared their views 
would not rind themselves "at an enormous disadvantage in the 
opening stages of a world war."92
Even though Winston argued for preparation, a private letter 
he wrote to Lloyd George suggests he already knew what the 
outcome would be in Czechoslovakia. As he had done so many times 
before, Churchill predicted the Munich Agreement. "Everything is
UlhiiL, 247. 
s2lhUL 259.
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overshadowed by the impending trial of will-power which is 
developing in Europe. I think we shall have to choose in the next 
few weeks between war and shame, and I have very little doubt 
what the decision will be."53
Churchill's next two articles written on September IS and 
October 4 also addressed Germany's interest in annexing 
Czechoslovakia. The first article was written prior to the Munich 
Agreement, the second five days after the Agreement was signed. In 
the first article, he wrote that inside Czechoslovakia, there was "an 
absolute determination to fight for life and freedom." If 
Czechoslovakia chose to fight, Churchill insisted, "from the moment 
that die first shot is fired and the German troops attempt to cross the 
Czechosovakian frontier, the whole scene will be transformed, and a 
roar of fury will arise from the free peoples of the world, which will 
proclaim nothing less than a crusade against the aggressor."34 The 
only problem with Churchill's assessment of the situation was that no 
action was being planned, or even contemplated by the British 
Government. On the contrary, Prime Minister Chamberlain was 
planning a trip to Germany to try to secure a peaceful settlement of 
terms with Hitler. Churchill's disgust with the situation led him to 
write with his heart rather than with his head. We have already 
noted his realization that Britain would most likely choose shame 
over war. Even though he was wrong in the case of Czechoslovakia, 3
33Cited in Gilbert The Prophet af Truth. 962.
34cited  in Churchill Step By Step. 268.
Churchill was ultimately correct in his assertion that the free world 
would not continue to ignore Nazi aggression. When Germany 
eventually invaded Poland, appeasement was not on the minds of the 
British cabinet. This time it would be war.
The second article describes his disgust with the unbearable 
pressure put on Czechoslovakia by Great Britain and France to accept 
the terms of the Munich Agreement. His language was at first 
fraught with despair at the situation. He, however, pointed out "It is 
a crime to despair." Churchill reminded the reader of another 
country that had found itself in an even worse situation, Germany 
after World War I. He insisted that if Germany could pull itself up 
out of the dark abyss it had fallen in to, Great Britain could do the 
same.
Churchill expressed his anger and disappointment with the 
Munich Agreement in a speech given to Parliament on October 5.
The speech was entitled "A Total and Unmitigated Defeat" and was 
met with harsh opposition as being "alarmist". In it Churchill began 
by stating, "what everybody would Uke to ignore or forget but which 
must nevertheless be stated, namely, that we(Britain) have sustained 
a total and unmitigated defeat, and that France has suffered even 
more than we have." Churchill claimed that Britain had a third 
choice between submission and war. Britain could have declared at a 
much earlier date that she would, join with the rest of Europe to 
defend Czechoslovakia against any unprovoked aggression. Britain's 
actions had alienated most of the central and eastern small countries 
in Europe. Churchill correctly pointed out that many of those
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countries now faced with the threat of the rise of Nazi power, had 
switched over to pro-German governments when they had 
previously been pro-Western democracies. Then Churcill reminded 
Parliament of all the wasted opportunities they had to secure peace 
since Hitler first obtained power in 1933. Winston refers to the fact 
that he
had tried his best to urge the maintenance of every 
bulwark of defense-first, the timely creation of an Air 
Force superior to anything within striking distance of our 
shore; secondly, the gathering together of the collective 
strength of many nations; and thirdly, the making of 
alliances and military conventions, all within the 
Covenant, in order to gather together forces in any rate to 
restrain the onward movement of this power. It has all 
been in vain. Every position has been successfully 
undermined and abandoned specious and plausible 
excuses.
Now, as time seemed to be running out, Churchill made one of 
his final pleas to Parliament to begin rearming. A few members of 
Parliament, Lord Baldwin in particular, were beginning to side with 
Churchill. Most on the other hand were not. Churchill pointed out 
that for two years he had had to "face, not only the Government's 
deprecation, but their stern disapproval." He now pointed out it 
would have been better if Parliament had listened to him two and a
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half yean earlier (Locust Speech). But there was still one cause for 
hope left to Britain according to Churchill. "The sole method that is 
open for us is to regain our old island independence by acquiring 
that supremacy in the air which we were promised, that security in 
our air defences which we were assured we had, and thus to make 
ounelves an island once again." Churchill asserts "never will you 
have friendship with the present German Government." Thus, 
Churchill ended his speech with a choice for the English people. "This 
is only the first sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be 
preferred to us year by year unless by a supreme recovery of moral 
health and martial vigour, we arise again and take our stand for 
freedom as in the olden time."99
By December 29, the tide among English popular opinion was 
beginning to turn. Even though Churchill was still met with strong 
opposition on a personal level by most of Parliament, his policies 
were beginning to gain approval or at least he believed they were. 
Churchill was once again becoming a popular public figure. His 
speeches were in great demand and were met with a warm 
reception. His Daily T alay raph  articles were being published globally, 
and he was receiving supportive mail all the time. In a letter to his 
wife he wrote, "It may well be that he (Chamberlain) will have to 
yield to the force of events, and will adopt my view and policy while 
disliking me all the more.”96 Churchill went on to tell his wife he just
" C ita d  in Churchill Blond. Toil. Tcira. m d Sweat. 130-144. 
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had a talk with Anthony Eden upon the latter's return from America. 
He told Churchill he would not rejoin the Government unless its 
policy first changed.
Churchill's next article for the Daily Telegraph was published 
on January 12, 1939. In his first article of the new year Churchill 
addressed the Germans' announcement that they intended to build 
sufficient submarines to reach parity with Great Britain. Churchill 
characterized the original Naval Treaty of 1935 as "a heavy blow at 
all inernational co-operation in support of public law". Now Britain 
would have to suffer the consequences.
By now, Churchill's popularity was growing at a steady pace. 
Finally, Parliament and the public alike were beginning to realize 
that it had been Churchill all along who was pointing them in the 
right direction, though they had chosen not to listen. On April 18, 
1939, Chamberlain formally announced in the House of Commons 
that a Ministry of Supply was to be established. Finally, Churchill's 
pleas were beginning to be heard and answered. He hoped that it 
was not to late for Great Britain.
In March, 1939 German troops Anally crossed into 
Czechoslovakia. That night Hitler slept in the Presidential Palace in 
Prague, and on the following morning proclaimed a Protectorate over 
Bohemia and Moravia. Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist, its Slovak 
region proclaim ing full independence and total support for Nazi 
Germany. "It seems to me, " Churchill wrote on March 19 to the 
former British Ambassador to Berlin, Sir Horace Rumbold, "Hitler will 
not stop short of the Black Sea unless by the threat of a general war,
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or actual hostilities." It was this event that led to the British 
gurantees to Poland and Romania.
In an article written for the Daily Telegraph on May 4,
Churchill published his forecast of the next area in which Hitler 
planned some "new outrage or invasion. It seems "only too 
probable", he wrote, "that the glare of Nazi Germany is to be turned 
on to Poland". Hitler's recent denunciation of the German-Polish non 
Agression Pact of 1934 was "an extremely serious and menacing 
step", particulary as Hitler did not seem aware "of the immense 
change which has been wrought in British public opinion by his 
treacherous breach of the Munich Agreement, and the complete 
reversal of policy which this outrage brought about in the British 
Government, and especially in the Prime Minister." Churchill further 
urged the Polish people to accept the involvement of Russia in 
European affairs because he felt their involvement would act as a 
decisive factor in preventing war. Churchill ended the article by 
stating that "there is no means of maintaining an Eastern front 
against Nazi aggression without the active aid of Russia."97
Churchill's next article for the Daily Telegraph was out of the 
ordinary in the sense that it praised the actions of the British 
Government. Published on May 18, the article praised the 
Government for announcing it was committed to protecting Turkey 
from unprovoked aggression. Churchill hoped the strengthening of
97Winstoo S. Churchill Daily Telegraph (London, May 4, 1939)
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the anit-Nazi grouping would "have a sobering influence upon the 
German Dictator."58
In a Daily Telegraph article published on June 8, now with the 
backing of the British Government at least in spirit, Churchill pressed 
for the rapid creation of a Triple Alliance among Britain, France, and 
Russia. Churchill hoped the Government would make greater efforts 
to secure an alliance with Russia. He was worried that their lack of 
enthusiasm was due to a less Arm attitude towards Nazi Germany.
He was concerned also with the wider world, specifically the 
attitude of the United States. He had heard from an American 
columnist, Walter Lippmann, that Joseph Kennedy, the United States 
Ambassador to Great Britain, was telling his friends that when war 
came Britain, facing defeat, would negotiate with Hitler. When 
Churchill heard the word "defeat" he turned to Lippman and 
declared:
No, the Ambassador should not have spoken so, Mr. 
Lippman: he should not have said that dreadful word.
Yet supposing, as I do not for one moment suppose, that 
Mr. Kennedy were correct in his tragic utterance, then I 
for rnie would willingly lay down my life in combat, 
rather than, in fear of defeat, surrender to the menaces of 
these most sinister iron.59
58Winston S. Churchill Daily Telegraph (London, May 18, 1939)
S9cited in Gilbert The Prophet of Truth. 1074.
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Churchill continued to argue against defeatism in any form. In 
an article for News of the World published on June 18, he insisted 
that no matter what Germany had in mind for Great Britain, the 
English people would be able to counter and overcome any attack 
upon their island. He also stated that the United States might 
eventually be drawn in to a war in which they were spectators to 
heavy civilian atrocities.
The last two articles we will examine both addressed the ever 
worsening situation that existed in Poland. The first article was 
published in the Daily Telegraph on June 22. In the article Churchill 
noted the growing efforts of Germany to put pressure on Poland. He 
discredited the German claims for Danzig as an attempt "to cut 
Poland from the sea" while massing German troops on the Slovak 
frontier in order to encircle Poland's "southern flank." Churchill 
continued his attack on Germany's ever growing pressure on Poland 
in his second article. Published on July 27, Churchill's article in the 
Daily M irror observed that the number of German troops amassing 
on Poland's borders "far exceeds the German force gathered for the
pretended "manoeuvres" of last September." Churchill also notes that 
white Hitter was talking peace, "all the time the German A m y is 
steadily being placed upon a war footing. A million reservists have 
been called up in addition to the normal army of a million men."60 
Also, Hitler was negotiating with Stalin during this time. Hitter's plan
60Winston S. Churchill Daily Mirror (Londonjuly 27, 1939)
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was to split up Poland between Germany and Russia. The agreement 
they reached in August, 1939, was known as the Hitler-Stalin Pact.
Only a few weeks after this article was published, Hitler 
invaded Poland on September 1 signaling the beginning of World 
War II and the eventual "Duel" between himself and Churchill. 
Finally, all of Britain would have to admit Chore hid was right d l 
along. He was even asked to join the Cabinet and would eventually 
succeed Chamberlain as Prime Minister. After years of scorn and 
wanting, Churchill was finally at his peak. However, England was 
not. It would be up to his leadership and abilities to save England 
from the "sinister menaces" be earlier referred to.
77
RETROSPECT
The purpose of this retrospect is threefold: first, we shell 
examine Hitler's perspective on Churchill in order to five some 
balance to this paper; second and thirdly, we shall examine 
Churchill's wartime and post-war writings on Hitler in order to give 
this paper some conclusion.
HITLER ON CHURCtflLL
Adolf Hitler's perspective of Churchill was far more personal 
than Churchill's perspective of him. Even though Churchill despised 
Hitler, he did not underestimate him. On the contrary, he spent nine 
years of his life warning the British people and the world of Hitler's 
plans to expand the German Empire. Even when Churchill finally 
took over the Prime Ministership he continued to "respect" Hitler’s 
abilities. Hitler, on the other hand, dismissed C&urchiU as a drunkard 
who did not understand how to ran a government, let alone wage 
war against the Third Reich. He alto believed Churchill was not 
popular among the British people. This belief may originally have 
had substance, but he continued to hold it long after Churchill 
regained popularity. Hitler especially did not like Churchill after
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reading the numerous number of articles in which Churchill criticized 
him. Also, Hitler correctly believed Chamberlain was a far easier 
target for manipulation than Winston.
Hitler's disgust for Churchill becomes quite evident when 
reading H itler's  T ab le  T alk , a compilation of notes taken by Dr. Henry 
Picker, an associate of Hitler’s, and Heinrich Heim, a civil servant in 
the Reich Ministry of Justice. This is how Hitler described Churchill's 
writings, "Churchill is the very type of corrupt journalist. There's not 
a worse prostitute in politics. He's an utterly amoral, repulsive 
creature."*1 These words do not suggest objectivity. Hitler is 
obviously letting his emotions get in the way. He even went as far to 
claim that Churchill was the puppet of the Jewish people. "The 
campaign of antagonism against Germany was organised by Churchill 
on the orders of his Jewish paymasters, and with the colllaboration of 
Eden, Vansittart and company. The Jew had already succeeded, step 
by step, in gaining complete control of the press." Obviously, this 
statement is utterly ridiculous. The peculiar thing about it is that 
one must assume Hitler believed it because it was said in the privacy 
of his own chambers. On another occassion Hitler continued this 
theme by stating, "Its a queer business how England got into the war. 
The man who managed it was Churchill, that puppet of the Jewry 
who pulls the strings." Hitler even went as far as dismissing
61 Dr. Henry Picker Hltlar’i T«hle T«llt (London,1953), 318.
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Churchill as « drunkard. "We m utt therefore go on talking about the 
drunkard Churchill."**
Hitler's words paint a far different picture of Churchill than the 
one most people know. Thus, Hitler allowed his personal feelings to 
cloud his judgem ent This mistake was to prove costly to him on a 
number of occasions, but such assessments are better left for another 
paper. What we do know is that Hitler’s perceptions of Churchill 
were at best unrealistic and at worst fictitious. Of two men, Churchill 
obviously held the upper hand when it came to understanding his 
prime adversary.
CHURCHILL ON HITLER: WARTIME
The diary of John Colville, Churchill's junior private secretary, 
serves as an excellent source for Churchill's wartime impressions on 
Hitler. Unlike Hitler, Churchill spent the war trying to analyze what 
Hitler would do next, rather than what his personal drinking habits 
were. For example, in a discussion with Colville, Winston said* 
"Hitler’s plans must change. He cannot have foreseen the collapse of 
France and must have planned his strategy of invasion on the 
assumption that the French armies would be bidding out on the
« A  am ber of setectkws from h»w . t.m.  t.«,
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Somme.” Winston did, however, sometimes make humorous off hand 
remarks about Hitler. These were intended more for fun and taken 
less seriously than Hitler's remarks on Churchill. When asked what 
he thought of Hitler's speech on July 21, 1940, Churchill replied, "I do 
not propose to say anything in reply to Hen Hitler's speech, not 
being on speaking terms with him." On another occassion Churchill 
referred to Hitler as Colonel Schiklgruber. Hitler was infuriarated by 
the remark.
Churchill did not forget his main objective when it came to 
Hitler. When asked by Colville how a staunch anti-communist like 
himself could forge an alliance with the Soviet Union, Churchill 
replied, he "had only one single purpose-the destruction of Hitler- 
and his life was much simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell he 
would at least make a favourable reference to the Devil in the House 
of Commons." Thus, we can see from this representative compilation 
of remarks that Churchill maintained his pre-war feelings towards 
Hitler. If anything, his hatred of him grew during these years.*3
*3Quotes are compiled from John Colville The Prinm  nf Power: to Downing 
1MQ.1M3 (New York, 1983)
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CHURCHILL ON HITLER: THE POST-WAR YEARS
Churchill's post-war writings on Hitler were more dispassionate 
than his pre-war newspaper articles. Most of what he wrote of 
World War II can be found in his six volume set, M em oirs of the 
Second W orld  W ar. Because by then Hitler was dead his memoirs 
were meant to provide history rather than to sway public opinion, it 
is harder to determine exactly how Churchill viewed Hitler in 
retrospect. Even though he hated him, Churchill definitely viewed 
him as a human being in the sense that he wrote of Hitler's problem- 
filled childhood in the first volume of M em oirs. Churchill’s feelings 
in retrospect can be best summed up by the answer he gave to John 
Colville's question, "Was Hitler a great man in the same sense that 
Napoleon was." Churchill replied, "No, he made too many mistakes.” 
and left it at that.64
“ Cited in Colville, 648.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the story of Winston Churchill between 1930 and 
1939 is the story of a man fighting to be heard by deaf ears. In his 
heart and in his mind he knew  Germany would rise again under 
Hitler's administration. As early as November, 1930, Churchill had 
convinced the German ambassador to London that he believed that 
Hitler and his followers would grasp the first chance to resort to 
arms again. From 1932 to 1936, Churchill continued to warn the 
British government and world of Hitler's plans to expand the German 
Empire. He further openly criticized the atrocities Hitler was 
committing within Germany long before many individuals accepted 
there were any atrocities being committed at all. By 1936, Churchill 
had been proven right again and again in his predictions. Germany 
was rearming at an alarming rate and Britain was growing 
comparatively weaker and weaker. In a desperate speech to 
Parliament Churchill implored the British Government to begin 
rearmament. Again his pleas fell on deaf ears. Churchill spent 1936- 
1938 campaigning for greater and greater increases in British 
rearmament. Slowly, the tide began to turn. Finally, it took the 
Munich Agreement to wake the public and the Government up. At 
first it was met with great enthusiasm until people began to realize 
just how far British foreign policy had deteriorated. Britain, once a
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great and commanding force in the European community, was now 
pandering to Hitler's demands. Finally, they had enough. Churchill's 
popularity began to grow in the public first, and then within 
Parliament. He continued his articles mid urged Great Britain not to 
take a "defeatist" attitude. At last he was met with approval rather 
than scorn. His warnings had not been in vain. At least, they would 
remind people that he had been aware all along of Hitler's intentions. 
This reminder would help him gain a Cabinet position and eventually 
the Prime Ministership. Without Churchill, Britain might have lost 
the war and the world might have fallen in to a darker period than 
ever known in human history.
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